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Penalty Clauses in Testaments: What Louisiana Can
Learn from the Common Law
"With trepidation I approach the 'in terrorem' doctrine, because of
the confusion of thought evidenced in the many reported cases and
published discussions."'
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last days of Bob's life, his mind showed significant
deterioration. Abby, his assistant and bookkeeper, helped Bob
update his will six days before he died. The amended testament
assigned twenty-five percent of the estate to Abby-an addition
that had not been included in the previous version of Bob's will.
Bob signed the updated document in the presence of two
witnesses, both of whom were related to Abby. After Bob's death,
his only daughter, Debbie, initiated proceedings to attack the will,
alleging undue influence. In response, Abby asked the court to
enforce a special provision contained in the testament that read, "If
any legatee under this Will in any manner whatsoever contests or
attacks this Will, any bequest I have made to that person under this
Will is revoked and shall be ,disposed of as if that contesting
beneficiary had predeceased me.
The peculiar provision in Bob's will is a typical example of an
in terrorem clause. These clauses, also called penalty, forfeiture, or
no-contest clauses, are designed to prevent a legatee from
contesting a will in court at the risk of forfeiture of his legacy.2 The
Latin phrase "in terrorem" means "into fear. ' 3 Indeed, the clauses
inflict fear not only upon the heirs but, as will be demonstrated,
upon legal practitioners and courts as well.4 The chief difficulty for
the courts arises out of the need to balance the right of testators to
Copyright 2010, by IRINA Fox.
1. Moskowitz v. Federman, 51 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
2. In terrorem clauses in the broad sense encompass penalties for non-
compliance with other conditions, for instance, "refraining from smoking,
marrying within a religion, or not marrying someone of another religion, or any
other condition, rather than simply not challenging a will." Martin D. Begleiter,
Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final Threat, 26
ARIz. ST. L.J. 629, 629 n.2 (1994). Most of the time the terms "in terrorem,"
"penalty," and "no-contest" are used interchangeably to signify the prohibition
against will contests. Id. This Comment will utilize the terms "in terrorem" and
"penalty" in their narrow meaning as synonyms to "no-contest."
3. "[1]n terrorem ... [Latin 'in order to frighten'] [b]y way of threat; as a
warning." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (8th ed. 2004).
4. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III (reflecting the confused state of
Louisiana jurisprudence).
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freely dispose of their estate against the heirs' right to pursue their
meritorious claims. 5 To make matters worse, testators can be
extremely creative in their phraseology of penalty clauses. 6 The
judicial analysis necessarily depends on the language of the clause
itself and the circumstances surrounding the contest, which makes
the courts' task even more arduous.
7
The difficulty in balancing the rights of testators and the rights
of heirs is exacerbated in Louisiana. Few cases involving penalty
clauses arose during the twentieth century, leaving Louisiana
courts without the opportunity to develop a systematic approach to
analyzing penalty clauses. 8 Changes in Louisiana successions law
have increased the likelihood that testators will resort to such
clauses and that litigation regarding them will ensue. Due to the
virtual abolition of forced heirship, a testator has more freedom in
5. See discussion infra Part V.C.
6. Wood Brown, Provisions Forbidding Attack in a Will, 4 TUL. L. REV.
421, 422 (1930) ("[T]he variations [on conditions] are limited in number only by
the limitations of human ingenuity.").
Sample clauses vary from the traditional type used by Bob to the specific and
more creative ones like examples that follow.
In the event that a beneficiary of any of the trust assets contests the
validity of any provision of the Settlor's Will, any trusts which the Settlor
or the Settlor's spouse have created, or any transfers to this trust or the
trust for the Settlor's spouse, such beneficiary shall lose all of his or her
right to any and all interests he or she may have from the Settlor's Will
and any trusts which the Settlor or the Settlor's spouse have created. The
person who has "contested" shall be deemed to have predeceased me.
Ackerman v. Genevieve Ackerman Family Trust, 908 A.2d 1200, 1201 (D.C.
2006).
Should my wife, Ymelda contest any provision of this trust or my will for
any reason whatsoever, or seek to obtain more than 46% of the stock of
Alacer now in the name of this trust, by whatever means including
seeking the order of any court to determine her community property
interest or confirm as community property to her a shareholder interest
greater than that I have provided, I direct that she shall receive nothing.
Patrick v. Turner, No. G037607, 2008 WL 4650403, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
22, 2008). See discussion infra Part III for the phraseology of various clauses
analyzed by Louisiana courts.
7. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-
Examined, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 320, 321 (1949).
8. Succession of Rouse, 80 So. 229 (La. 1918); Hoggatt v. Gibbs, 12 La.
Ann. 770 (La. 1857); In re Succession of Scott, 950 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2006), writ denied, 948 So. 2d 176 (La. 2007); Succession of Wagner, 431
So. 2d 10 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Succession of Rosenthal, 369 So. 2d 166,
178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 1345 (La. 1979);
Succession of Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), writ denied,
369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979); Hughes v. Burguieres, 258 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1972), affd in part, 276 So. 2d 267 (La. 1973); Succession of Kern, 252 So.
2d 507 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), writ refused, 254 So. 2d 462 (La. 1971).
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determining how to dispose of his estate. 9 This increased freedom
may prompt testators to resort to penalty provisions as a guarantee
that their wills are enforced.' ° With limited exceptions, the estate is
now "freely alienable," which allows testators to be creative in
their bequests. 1' At the same time, descendants of testators who are
left out of the will are more likely to file suit challenging the will
because, save in rare circumstances, they are no longer entitled to a
portion of the testator's estate by law.
This likely increase in the use and litigation of penalty clauses
necessitates the clarity that this Comment strives to provide by
proposing a framework for analyzing penalty clauses in Louisiana.
Part II presents the background of penalty provisions in Roman
and French history. Part III reviews and summarizes the trends in
more than one hundred years of Louisiana jurisprudence, while at
the same time identifying the gaps in courts' analysis. Part IV
examines the history and modem common law in search of the
solution for Louisiana's problems. Part V establishes a flexible
framework for analyzing penalty provisions in Louisiana that
combines Louisiana's civil law heritage with the equitable
common law approach. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
The statutory authority for analyzing penalty clauses in
Louisiana is Louisiana Civil Code article 1519, which provides
that "[i]n all dispositions inter vivos and mortis causa impossible
conditions, those which are contrary to the laws or to morals, are
reputed not written."'12 Louisiana jurisprudence has used French
9. In 1996, the legislature limited forced heirship to "children who are less
than twenty-four years of age at the time of the decedent's death, or children of
any age who are permanently disabled at the time of the decedent's death."
Kerry J. Miller, The New Forced Heirship Law, Its Implementing Legislation,
and Major Substantive Policy Changes of the Louisiana State Law Institute's
Proposed Comprehensive Revision of the Successions and Donations Laws, 71
TuL. L. REv. 223, 223 (1996).
10. Louisiana jurisprudence is clear that a penalty clause infringing upon
the forced heir's legitime is void as contrary to the law and public morals. See,
e.g., Hoggatt, 12 La. Ann. at 770 (stating that the penalty clause depriving the
daughter of her forced portion was contrary to the law); Kern, 252 So. 2d at 510
("[T]here would be little problem [with the enforcement of the clause] in the
absence of forced heirs").
11. Miller, supra note 9, at 226.
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1519 (2008); see, e.g., Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1067-
68 (citing LEONARD OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 129, in 10
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 254 (1973); AUBRY & RAU, DROrT CIVIL
FRANqAIS § 692, at 295 (Carlos Lazarus trans., 1969); Brown, supra note 6, at
421) ("Commentators have stated that the governing statutory provision is LSA-
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law as a framework for determining the validity of the underlying
disposition, which in turn finds its roots in Roman law.' 3 Thus, a
brief examination of the law in those jurisdictions is required.
A. Roman Law: The Birth of the Modern Civil Law Approach
Most civilian legal systems contain a statute similar to
Louisiana's article 1519.14 This general civil law principle dates
back to Roman law. 15 The practice of considering illicit and
immoral conditions not written might have been caused by the
desire to preserve the testament despite the failure of a condition
C.C. Article 1519. . ."). Some Louisiana sources claim that article 1519 is taken
directly from the Code Napoleon. Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1067-68; see
FREDERICK WILLIAM SWAIM, JR. & KATHRYN VENTURATOS LoRIo, SUCCESSIONS
AND DONATIONS § 12.3, in 10 LOUISIANA CIvIL LAW TREATISE 297 (1995)
("Code Napoleon Article 900 is the counterpart of Louisiana Article 1519.").
There is a long-standing controversy over the historical origins of the 1808
Louisiana Digest, specifically, whether its roots are French or Spanish. See, e.g.,
Vernon Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: Historical
Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana Civil
Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067 (2003); Vernon Palmer, The Recent Discovery of
Moreau Lislet's System of Omissions and Its Importance to the Debate over the
Sources of the Digest of 1808, 49 Loy. L. REV. 301, 301 n.2 (2003) (citing the
following sources on the French-Spanish debate: Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the
Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 TuL. L. REV. 628
(1972); Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza,
46 TuL. L. REV. 603 (1972); Thomas Tucker, Interpretation of the Louisiana Civil
Codes 1808-1840: The Failure of the Preliminary Title, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F.
57 (2004); John Cairns, The 1808 Digest of Orleans and 1866 Civil Code of
Lower Canada: An Historical Study of Legal Change (1980) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Edinburgh University) (on file with Tulane Law Library)).
This Comment does not attempt to resolve the controversy over the origins of
article 1519. The language of the French and Spanish articles is virtually identical,
and the actual source of the Louisiana article is unlikely to have practical
implications in this context. Compare the language of the French article ("In any
inter vivos or testamentary disposition, impossible conditions or those which are
contrary to laws or to morals are considered not written." THE FRENCH CIVIL
CODE 187 (John N. Crabb trans., Fred. B. Rothman & Co. ed., 1977) (translating
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 900 (Fr.)) with its Spanish counterpart ("Impossible
conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even when the testator disposes otherwise." Brown, supra note 6, at 422 n.2
(translating CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 792 (1888) (Spain)).
13. SWAIM & LORIO, supra note 12, § 12.5, at 297.
14. Brown, supra note 6, at 421.
15. See generally Brown, supra note 6 (providing a survey of different
versions of this rule adopted in civil law jurisdictions).
because "the Romans dreaded dying intestate."' 16 The Romans
resorted to various measures to ensure that a testament would be
preserved despite the annulment of a condition. 17 For instance, if
the legatee took an oath to abide by the condition imposed by the
testator, the praetor could grant the legatee a release from such an
oath if the condition was illicit or immoral. 18 Another solution was
to regard the impossible conditions as "inadvertent," implying that
the testator would not have purposely added a condition that might
cause his intestacy. 19
Although there is no consensus as to the consequence the
Romans attached to impossible or immoral conditions, two schools
of thought can be identified: Proculians and Sabinians.2 0 One of
the differences in methodology employed by the two schools is
related to textual interpretation. In reviewing contracts and wills,
Proculians "advocated a strict, objective interpretation of the words
used, whatever may have been the intention of the author of the
text and often without regard to the consequences., 22 Proculians
looked at "the objective agreement of the parties, as expressed in
the formulation of the contract." 23 Following the rule applicable to
contracts, Proculians would annul the whole legacy if the condition
contained therein was determined to be contrary to the law or
public policy.24 On the other hand, Sabinians "favored a looser and
less rigid approach to the interpretation of texts. 25 In interpreting
16. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 286 n.2; see also SWAIM &
LORIO, supra note 12, § 12.3, at 297 (describing devices utilized "to avoid the
Roman disgrace of dying without an instituted heir"). But see Ronald J. Scalise,
Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 41, 42 n.5 (2008) (citing varying views on the attitude of the
Romans to intestacy).
17. SWAIM & LORIO, supra note 12, § 12.3, at 297.
18. Id. In Rome, the praetor was responsible for the administration of justice.
See generally WILLIAM ALEXANDER HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL
ExPOsrrION OF ROMAN LAW IN THE ORDER OF A CODE 34 (4th ed. 1903).
19. SWAIM & LORIO, supra note 12, § 12.3, at 297.
20. Brown, supra note 6, at 422 n.2 (citing WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND,
TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 336 (1921); 1 HENRY JOHN ROBY, ROMAN PRIVATE
LAW § 5, at 317 (1902)). But see HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: A
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 105-06 (4th ed. 1978) (providing a discussion of
the origins of the two schools and noting that "all attempts to attribute to these
schools definite contrasting attitudes concerning basic principles of law or
philosophy have failed").
21. Peter Stein, Interpretation and Legal Reasoning in Roman Law, 70
CHI.-KENTL. REV. 1539, 1545 (1995).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1546.
24. Brown, supra note 6, at 422 n.2.
25. Stein, supra note 21, at 1546.
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wills, Sabinians were concerned with ascertaining the intent of the
testator, without dwelling on the objective meaning of the will's
language.26 Thus, Sabinians are considered to be the founders of
the modem-day civilian approach of preserving the leqacy as a
whole after striking down the illicit or immoral condition. 7
B. French Law: Focus on the Underlying Disposition
The Sabinian approach has been carried on in France, where
penalty clauses ordinarily are regarded as valid, and their
enforcement results in the heir forfeiting his bequest.28 The validity
and enforceability of a particular penalty clause hinge upon the
success of the heir's contest of the underlying disposition. 9 If the
contestant fails to show that the disposition is illegal or immoral, the
penalty clause becomes enforceable, and the heir will forfeit the
bequest. 30 On the other hand, if the contestant succeeds in
demonstrating that the disposition is contrary to the law or good
morals, the penalty clause will be deemed unwritten, and the
contestant will not be punished.31 The contestant is not allowed any
leeway for challenging the will in good faith.32 As justification for
this unsympathetic approach, French commentators note that "there
is nothing more worthy than the wish of the testator to prevent
wrangling in the courts among his heirs" and that strict enforcement
of penalty provisions is bound to make the heirs think twice before
attacking the will.33 Nonetheless, the harshness of this approach is
apparent, for "no one can be sure that a disposition is actually
against law or morals until the court has decided the point." 34
26. Id. at 1547.
27. Brown, supra note 6, at 422 n.2; see also SWAIM & LoRIo, supra note 12,
§ 12.3, at 296 (citing MARCEL PLANIOL, 3 TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DRorr CivIL
481-82 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959) (1938); Comment, Impossible
Conditions in Roman and Modern Law: Summary Review, 16 TuL. L. REv. 433,
433-34 (1942)) (discussing the difference in approaches of the two Roman
schools).
28. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 296. At some point French law
considered penalty clauses contra bonos mores because they deprived
individuals of their access to courts. Brown, supra note 6, at 423.
29. Brown, supra note 6, at 423-24.
30. Id. at 424.
31. C. Civ. art. 900 (Fr.) (1804).
32. Brown, supra note 6, at 424.
33. Id. at 424-25 (citing RAYMOND THtODORE TROPLONG, DES
DONATIONS ENTRE-VLFS ET DES TESTAMENTS § 265, at 341 (1855)).
34. Id.
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In their analysis, French courts distinguish between private and
public interests as reasons for will contests. 35 A private interest
reflects merely pecuniary considerations of the heir.36 If a will
contains no dispositions contrary to the law or good morals, the
will is only "susceptible to attack for causes of private interests."
37
The contesting beneficiary will be penalized even though the
judicial action brought by him merely requests an interpretation of
the testament. 38 Further, if the lawsuit results in the court declaring
the disposition null, the penalty will nonetheless be imposed on the
beneficiary who brought the lawsuit. 39 However, French courts
treat the heir more generously when the penalty provision appears
ambiguous.40 In those cases, "the tendency is to apply it mildly or
not at all."41 In sum, if the heir contests the will out of private or
pecuniary considerations, and the will contains nothing contrary to
the law or good morals, French courts typically enforce the penalty
clause, even if the will is annulled.42
The result may be different if the will contest is based on "public
interest." The analysis of a public interest attack focuses on whether
the underlying disposition would effect a violation of the law or
public order and good morals.43 When the underlying disposition is
against the law or public order, French courts apply Code Civil
article 900 to illicit or immoral conditions,44 the language of which
35. Id. at 423.
36. Id. Some examples of such "private interest" attacks are "a partition
made by ascendants among their descendants, or for lesion beyond one-fourth."
AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 297.
37. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 296-97.
38. Id. at 297. Brown refers to at least one French commentator who
suggests that the heir may request an interpretation of the testament, and if the
heir's interpretation is not found to be violative of the decedent's intent, the
court is unlikely to enforce the penalty. Brown, supra note 6, at 425.
39. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 297.
40. Brown, supra note 6, at 425.
41. Id. at 425 (citing 11 FRANCOIs LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL §
490, at 638 (5th ed. 1893)).
42. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 297.
43. Id. at 295. Some examples of such illegal or immoral dispositions are
those "made to persons incapable of receiving, or ... donations or legacies that
are either: tainted with substitutions, obtained through captation or suggestion,
impinge upon the received portion of the heirs, or are contained in a testament
which is null as to form." Id. at 295-96.
44. For an interesting take on the history behind Code Civil article 900, see
AUBRY & RAU, supra note 12, § 692, at 286 n.2 (claiming that the origin of this
article "is traceable to the laws of the revolutionary period which were prompted
by the apprehension that donors and testators would perpetuate the practices of
the old regime in contravention of the new order under the guise of imposing
conditions on their liberalities"); see also SWAIM & LORIO, supra note 12, §
12.3, at 297 n.5 (stating that Code Civil article 900 fulfilled a need of the
2010] 1271
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is virtually identical to its Louisiana counterpart. 45 In cases in which
the main disposition is illicit or immoral, the penalty clause
"automatically becomes against good morals, since it is surely ... to
the public interest that such dispositions in wills be attacked.,
46
Thus, the court will consider the penalty clause not written and willt - . 47
not impose the penalty upon the beneficiary.
The French approach can be illustrated by its application to
Bob's will and its contest by his daughter Debbie described in the
introduction. Imagine that Debbie acquired a report from her
father's doctor that stated her father's mind showed noticeable
deterioration around the time his will was revised. Should Debbie
decide to question whether her father had capacity to amend the
testament,4 the destiny of her entitlement to a portion of her
father's estate would depend on the validity of the underlying
will.49 If the court were to conclude that Bob lacked the necessary
capacity, the will would be invalid. Thus, the penalty clause would
be deemed unwritten, and Debbie would keep her entitlement. The
problem would arise if the court ultimately decided that Bob was in
sound mind at the time he amended his will. In this case, the
testament would be valid, which would result in the automatic
validity of the penalty clause. The penalty clause would then
become enforceable and would effect a forfeiture of Debbie's share.
revolution in France by preventing counterrevolutionary endeavors of "the
privileged classes who could use donations and legacies to keep others
(particularly children) in line, such as, conditions that forbade marrying lower
classes, etc. Article 900 permitted the legatee to keep the bequest without
fulfilling that illicit or immoral condition").
45. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1519 (2008) ("In all dispositions inter
vivos and mortis causa impossible conditions, those which are contrary to the
laws or to morals, are reputed not written.") with THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE,
supra note 12, at 187 ("In any inter vivos or testamentary disposition, impossible
conditions or those which are contrary to laws or to morals are considered not
written.") (translating C. ciV. art. 900 (Fr.)).
46. Brown, supra note 6, at 423 (citing LAURENT, supra note 41, § 474, at
619).
47. Id. at 424.
48. The original example in the introduction was based on a situation giving
rise to a potential claim of undue influence in Louisiana. However, Debbie's suit
alleging undue influence may be problematic under French law, which
technically does not recognize "undue influence" as a legal concept. See
generally Scalise, supra note 16 (discussing the functional equivalents of undue
influence in jurisdictions not explicitly recognizing it as a legal concept).
49. Brown, supra note 6, at 423-24.
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III. LOUISIANA'S APPROACH AND ITS PROBLEMS
Louisiana jurisprudence addressing penalty clauses spans over
the past century and a half, yet courts have not proposed a clear
standard for the analysis of such clauses. In fact, one decision
mentioned that the validity of penalty clauses "has not been
judicially determined with finality." ° Although Louisiana's
approach to penalty clauses is uncertain, several general principles
have emerged.
A. Determining Whether the Suit Is a Contest
When handling a suit based on a will with a penalty clause, a
few Louisiana decisions begin by determining whether a particular
lawsuit brought by the heir amounts to a contest within the
language of the will.51 If the action does not amount to a contest,
the penalty provision does not apply and there is no need for the
court to determine its validity.
52
For example, in Succession of Rosenthal, the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal had to establish whether a lawsuit was a
contest.5 3 The executrix of the estate-the testator's widow-
attempted to enforce a penalty provision in her late husband's will
after the decedent's nephew filed suit.54 The nephew, a legatee
under the will, brought his judicial action against the executrix for
improperly handling the estate.55 The dispute arose in part because
of the "shortage of cash required for the payment of the succession
debts."56 The court refused to enforce the penalty clause, noting
that the "appropriate action to have the will properly administered"
did not constitute "an attack on the will as contemplated by the
testator. ' ' 57 By determining that the action by the plaintiff would
not amount to a contest within the scope of the penalty provision,
the fourth circuit correctly avoided the discussion of the validity
50. Succession of Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979),
writ denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979); see discussion infra Part III.D.
51. Succession of Rouse, 80 So. 229 (La. 1918); In re Succession of Scott,
950 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006), writ denied, 948 So. 2d 176 (La. 2007);
Succession of Rosenthal, 369 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied,
371 So. 2d 1345 (La. 1979); Hughes v. Burguieres, 258 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1972), aff'd in part, 276 So. 2d 267 (La. 1973); see discussion infra Part
V.A.
52. Rouse, 80 So. at 234; Rosenthal, 369 So. 2d at 178.
53. 369 So. 2d 166.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 170.
56. Id. at 169.
57. Id. at 178.
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and enforceability of the clause. This case exemplifies the principle
that certain judicial actions may not fall under the definition of the
contest contemplated by the penalty clause.
B. Ascertaining the Testator's Intent
When the lawsuit does amount to a contest, Louisiana courts
have consistently emphasized the need to ascertain the intent of the
testator. 58 Obviously, by inserting a penalty clause in his will, the
testator intends to do exactly that-penalize the contesting
beneficiary. Louisiana courts nonetheless tend not to uphold
penalty provisions. Under the banner of testamentary freedom,
Louisiana jurisprudence finds creative ways to forgo the very
intent behind the plain language of the threat of forfeiture.
The most striking example of a court's resourcefulness is the
analysis in Succession of Wagner.59 The estate in question was
community property formerly existing between the testator and his
pre-deceased wife.0 The testator's four children and one grandson
protested against the mortis causa donation of a piece of land to a
certain Marie Amick, presumably the testator's mistress. 61 The
contestants alleged that their father only owned a one-half interest
in the land and thus could not bequeath the entire interest to the
mistress.62 Evidence indicated that the testator was aware that he
could not bequeath the lot because he did not have full ownership
of it.63 Nonetheless, the testator's intent, as ascertained by the
fourth circuit, was to ensure that the lot passed to the mistress. To
solidify this intent, the testator inserted a penalty clause threatening
forfeiture of the disposable portion of the estate by the children
should any of them "object to the ... disposition of that particular
58. See, e.g., Succession of Wagner, 431 So. 2d 10, 12 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1983) ("[T]he testator's 'intention must be ascertained from the whole will, and
effect must be given to every part of the will as far as the law will permit....
[T]he court should select that interpretation which will carry out the intention of
the testator." (quoting Succession of LaBarre, 153 So. 15, 16 (La. 1934)));
Succession of Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065, 1069 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) ("[I]n
the interpretation of testaments the court must seek to carry out the intention of
the testator." (citing Carter v. Succession of Carter, 332 So. 2d 439, 441 (La.
1976)), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979).
59. Wagner, 431 So. 2d 10.
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id. Note that the court never explicitly states that Marie Amick is the
testator's mistress.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id.
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lot to [the mistress]., 65 The penalty clause specified that upon an
objection, the disposable portion of the whole estate would go to
the mistress.66 Although the penalty provision clearly stated that
the children would forfeit their portion if they objected to the
disposition,67 the court interpreted the provision as a conditional
bequest, rather than as a penalty clause per se.68 Under this
interpretation, the court gave the heirs an option of either
transferring their interest to the mistress or forfeiting the
disposable portion of the estate. 69 The court noted that this
"optional bequest [was] not repugnant to law or good morals and
[was] valid as a conditional legacy."70
While the Wagner decision theoretically acknowledges the
validity of the penalty clause, it does not mandate forfeiture due to
the will contest; rather, it gives the heirs an option to comply with
the condition at the threat of forfeiture. 7 1 The contestants in this
case were forced heirs, so the resulting forfeiture would not have
stripped them of their legitime.72 Despite that, it appears that the
court felt sympathetic to the children and therefore found a way to
creatively interpret the penalty clause so as not to enforce it.
C. Exceptions to the Rule of Validity
Paradoxically, having never enforced a penalty clause,
Louisiana decisions consistently make it clear that the clauses are
not per se against the law or public policy. 73 Nonetheless, if the
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13. But see Succession of Rouse, 80 So. 229, 234 (La. 1918),
where the court concluded, based on a similar factual matter, that the suit by the
decedent's children for the settlement of the community property existing
between the children's mother and father did not amount to a contest within the
scope of the penalty clause. See discussion infra Part V.A.
69. Wagner, 431 So. 2d at 13.
70. Id.
71. Id. ("[The penalty clause] puts no one in a position to defeat a legacy by
merely objecting or contesting the will. It simply implements the alternative
provision if the heirs do not comply with the testator's wishes.").
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., id. at 13 (disagreeing with the heirs who claimed that penalty
clauses are contra bonos mores); Succession of Kern, 252 So. 2d 507, 510 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971) (noting that the clauses are enforceable if they are
"restricted to protests or challenges by the legatees receiving a benefit from the
will" and "in the absence of forced heirs"), writ refused, 254 So. 2d 462 (La.
1971). But see Succession of Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979) ("[The] validity of such a clause in Louisiana has not been judicially
determined with finality."), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979).
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clause infringes on the rights of forced heirs, it will be invalidated
as contrary to the law. Although forced heirship has been
radically curtailed,75 invalidation of provisions contrary to the law
remains a pertinent principle because it shows that in analyzing a
penalty clause the court will look at the whole disposition,
following the French approach. 76 Infringement upon the forced
portion is just one illustration of how Louisiana courts handle the
invalidity of the underlying disposition.
In Hoggatt v. Gibbs, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed a
will implicating forced heirship. 77 The testator had three children,
all of whom were his forced heirs.78 The will contained a clause
that required one of the testator's daughters to relinquish her claim
to one-third of the whole estate, which amounted to more than
$100,000. 79  Instead, the testator bequeathed her $20,000
threatening complete disinherison should the daughter protest. 8
The dispute discussed by the supreme court dealt solely with the
relinquishment of a claim to real estate.8 1 The court did not analyze
the applicability of the penalty clause, but in dicta noted that the
testator's clause mandating that the daughter abandon her lawful
claim to one-third of the estate "was contrary to law .... 82 The
court cited article 1506 of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, which is
the same as the current article 1519.83
Another exception from the general rule of validity established
by Louisiana jurisprudence encompasses penalty provisions with
overbroad language and effect. For instance, in Succession of Kern,
74. Wagner, 431 So. 2d at 13 (noting that the penalty clause was valid
where it did not "deprive the forced heirs of anything they [were] legally entitled
to, i.e., their legitime"); Kern, 252 So. 2d at 510.
75. See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship
Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution," 50 LA. L. REV. 409 (1990) (discussing
the impact of 1989 La. Acts No. 788 limiting forced heirship to children under
the age of twenty-three or individuals who are interdicted or subject to
interdiction).
76. But see Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065 (refusing to address the validity of
the underlying disposition and dismissing plaintiff's suit for failure to state a
cause of action). See discussion infra Part III.D.
77. 12 La. Ann. 770 (La. 1857).
78. Id. at 771.
79. Id. at 771-72.
80. Id. at 772.
81. Id. at 770.
82. Id. at 771-72.
83. Id. at 772. "In all dispositions inter vivos and mortis causa impossible
conditions, those which are contrary to the laws or to morals, are reputed not
written." LA. CIv. CODE art. 1506 (1825) (current version at LA. CIV. CODE art.
1519 (2008)).
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the fourth circuit invalidated a penalty provision in a testament.84
The will contained three particular bequests.8 5 One of the
decedent's nieces received $10,000; another niece inherited all of
the decedent's jewelry.8 6 The third bequest in the amount of
$10,000 was for the Crippled Children's Hospital in New
Orleans. 7 The remainder of the estate was to be distributed among
the decedent's brothers and sisters on a condition that the $10,000
for the Crippled Children's Hospital was to be paid from the
portion of the decedent's sister. 8 The will further included a
penalty provision that would effect a forfeiture by all the legatees
if the will was attacked "in any way by any heir."8 9 The will
provided that the Crippled Children's Hospital was to receive all of
the estate should the penalty clause be triggered by a contest." The
decedent's will was attacked by his nephew who was not a named
legatee, and yet was technically a collateral heir.91 The Crippled
Children's Hospital intervened in the lawsuit, arm.ing that the
penalty clause was valid and should be enforced. 2 The fourth
circuit disagreed, noting that the potential of a contest by any heir,
whether or not he is a named legatee under the will, left the
legatees "virtually helpless and at the mercy of any heir not
mentioned in the will.' ' 93 The court proceeded to underscore that
the penalty clause was "particularly vicious since there is a third
party [i.e., the Crippled Children's Hospital], not an heir,
designated to reap the benefits of a protest or challenge by 'any
heir.' 94 This broad provision was "repugnant to law and good
morals and [could not] be sanctioned by the courts." 95
As Hoggatt and Kern both demonstrate, Louisiana courts will
not indiscriminately enforce penalty provisions. Although they
emphasize the need to ascertain and carry out the testator's
84. 252 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), writ refused, 254 So. 2d 462
(La. 1971).
85. Id. at 508.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. But see Succession of Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1979) (providing no comment on the overbreadth of the clause that, in place
of the entitlement, threatened to bequeath the sum of one dollar not only to the
contestant, but also the "spouse and/or issue of such person"), writ denied, 369
So. 2d 154 (La. 1979). See discussion of Gardiner infra Part III.D.
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intent,96 courts will look at the effect of the clause to determine
whether it violates the law or public policy. If so, courts will
invalidate the penalty provision.
D. The Effect of Invalidating the Penalty Clause
If a particular penalty provision is determined to be invalid, as
happened in Kern, courts follow article 1519: the penalty clause
will be struck from the will, and the testament will be reviewed as
if the penalty clause were not written.97 Indeed, the court in Kern
concluded that "the penal clause is contra bonos mores, null in its
entirety and therefore regarded as if it were not in the will."'98 The
court is correct to annul the entire penalty provision, meaning both
the forfeiture clause proper (warning that the legatees will forfeit in
case of a contest) and the residuary clause (allocating the whole
estate to the Crippled Children's Hospital after forfeiture occurs).
However, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in
Succession of Gardiner took a different approach: it distinguished
the penalty provision from the residuary disposition, noting that the
two parts were to be read as alternatives. The will in that case
contained a forfeiture clause composed of two sentences.' 00 The
first forewarned that the contestant and the contestant's spouse and
children would relinquish their bequest and instead receive one
dollar.' 0' The penalty clause then specified that if the will was
invalidated and intestacy resulted as to all or a portion of the estate,
the forfeited portion would go to certain charitable entities. 10 2 The
testament in Gardiner provided that the immovable property
located outside of the decedent's home state of Connecticut was to
make up the corpus of a trust. 0 3 The will further mandated that the
immovables in Louisiana be alienated last by the trustees after all
other assets under the will were disbursed. 10 4 When the last income
beneficiary died, the rest of the trust assets were to be distributed
96. See supra note 58.
97. Carter v. Succession of Carter, 332 So. 2d 439 (La. 1976); Gardiner,
366 So. 2d at 1068 ("[If] the penalty clause is invalid, the effect of such a
holding would be to strike the penalty clause from the testament, leaving the
remainder of the will as written."); Succession of Burgess, 359 So. 2d 1006 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1978). But see Succession of Thompson, 49 So. 651 (La. 1909)
(striking down the entire will because of an impossible condition).
98. Kern, 252 So. 2d at 509.
99. Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1069.
100. Id. at 1067-68.
101. Id. at 1067.
102. Id. at 1068.
103. Id. at 1066.
104. Id.
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among the decedent's grandnephews, a few hospitals, and a
university. 1
The decedent's niece challenged the will in Louisiana, alleging
that the portion of the will affecting the immovables located within
the state was null and void under Louisiana law, 10 6 as the trust
provisions contained prohibited substitutions and violated laws as
to "the lenth of time immovables can be kept out of
commerce."" Notably, the third circuit never discussed the
possibility of enforcing the penalty against the niece; instead it
concluded that the penalty clause provided enough Frounds to
grant the defendants' exception of no cause of action.' 0 The court
first mentioned that the validity of penalty clauses in Louisiana
"has not been judicially determined with finality."'1 9 It then
acknowledged that if the penalty clause was invalid, "the effect of
such a holding would be to strike the penalty clause from the
testament, leaving the remainder of the will as written.""1 1
0
In construing the penalty provision, the court unexpectedly
divided it into two parts and considered only the first sentence that
threatened forfeiture to be the penalty clause proper."' The second
sentence naming different charities as residual legatees was
regarded by the court as an entirely separate provision even
though both were contained in the same article of the will.ifi2 The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs contention that the "provision
making the charities residuary legatees as to any invalid donations
is inseparable from the 'penalty clause' contained in the first
sentence of [the] article."' r3 It was clear to the court that the two
provisions were "intended as alternatives," thus making it
unnecessary to decide on the validity of the penalty clause.
114
Without any clarification, the court noted that, even if the penalty
clause were to be found invalid, the invalidity would not affect the
residuary bequest, which would still be valid.' 15 Continuing its
confusing reasoning, the third circuit concluded that the plaintiff
had "no cause of action to annul the testament at issue.
116
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1069.
108. Id. Defendants were the executors, income beneficiaries, and corpus
beneficiaries. Id. at 1066.
109. Id. at 1067.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1069.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Gardiner leaves open many questions. First, retaining the
residuary disposition despite the annulment of the penalty
provision would lead to absurd results in many circumstances. For
instance, in Kern, the residuary clause stated that the whole estate
would pass to the Cippled Children's Hospital should the penalty
clause be triggered."" The residuary disposition would apply only
after forfeiture occurred. 1 8 The fourth circuit in that case rightly
invalidated the penalty provision as a whole. 119 After Gardiner,
courts may separately analyze each subpart of the penalty clause.
But severing only one sentence seems to violate the testator's
intent behind the penalty provision: the second sentence naming
the residuary legatees is essential and ordinarily inseparable from
the first sentence that threatens forfeiture. 1
20
Second, the result reached by the Gardiner court shielded the
will from contest by declaring that the plaintiff had no cause of
action. 12 Yet, the penalty clause was not upheld as to result in the
plaintiff's forfeiture.' 22 As in Wagner, where the court did not
enforce the penalty clause against the decedent's children,
123
perhaps the court in Gardiner felt sympathetic for the niece.
However, the reason for the court's ruling is unclear due to the
lack of explanation.
Third, the Gardiner court did not follow the traditional French
approach of determining the validity of the underlying
disposition. 124 A challenge based on prohibited substitutions is one
involving public interests, which creates a valid ground for contest
under French law. 125 Breaking up the penalty clause into two
subparts, the court in Gardiner found that even if the attack was
successful, the purpose of the second part of the penalty clause was
"to provide for the disposition of any invalid donations."' 126 The
court stated that since the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action,
it was not necessary to "decide the merits of the difficult questions
raised by the plaintiff with regard to whether the trust provisions
contain prohibited substitutions or fidei commissa, whether the
117. Succession of Kern, 252 So. 2d 507, 510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), writ
refused, 254 So. 2d 462 (La. 1971).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1069.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Succession of Wagner, 431 So. 2d 10, 13 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
124. Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1069.
125. AUBRY & RAu, supra note 12, § 692, at 295-96; see discussion supra
Part II.B.
126. Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1069.
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trust provisions violate laws dealing with the length of time
immovables can be kept out of commerce," and other contentions
of the plaintiff.127 Dismissing the plaintiffs suit for failure to state
a cause of action, the third circuit further confused Louisiana's
already perplexing approach to penalty clauses.1
28
E. The Problem of Validity and Enforceability
The seemingly irreconcilable decisions discussed above
demonstrate that Louisiana courts have found many ingenious
ways to tackle penalty clauses. As a result of this creativity and,
perhaps, sympathy for the contesting beneficiary, no penalty
provision has ever been upheld as to effect the contesting
beneficiary's forfeiture. Louisiana courts simply never have been
required to determine what would happen to the contesting
beneficiary if the penalty clause is valid. In relation to the destiny
of the contesting beneficiary, the French approach of reviewing the
underlying disposition is inadequate not only because of its
harshness, but also because it determines only the validity of the
disposition, without analyzing the enforceability of the penalty
clause. 129
The French approach is likely to cause confusion because the
questions of the validity of the whole disposition, the validity of
the penalty clause, and the enforceability of the penalty clause are
three separate and distinct inquiries. The analysis of the validity of
the disposition is illustrated by Hoggatt, the case implicating
forced heirship.' 30 Because the disposition in that case infringed on
the forced portion of the testator's daughter, it was contrary to the
law.' 3 ' Thus, the penalty clause was automatically void.1 2 Now
returning to the characters from the introductory example, assume
that Bob's will asserted that Debbie would get her share only if she
married a man of the same race. Suspecting that Louisiana courts
would not sanction this condition, Bob inserted a penalty clause to
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. As a reminder, the French approach, which Louisiana purports to
follow, directly depends on the success of the contest and concentrates on the
underlying disposition: if the whole disposition contains nothing contrary to the
law or public policy, the penalty clause is valid and thus automatically
enforceable. But see id. at 1069 (dismissing the plaintiff's contest for failure to
state a cause of action and never discussing the validity of the underlying
disposition).
130. Hoggatt v. Gibbs, 12 La. Ann. 770 (La. 1857); see discussion supra Part
III.C.
131. Hoggatt, 12 La. Ann. at 771-72.
132. Id.
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prevent Debbie from challenging the will. This disposition is
clearly invalid as against public policy; as a result the court would
strike the entire condition, including the penalty clause, from the
will. Hoggatt and other cases like the hypothetical with a similar
problem of the invalidity of the underlying disposition are the
limited examples of the effectiveness of the French approach.
However, the validity of the underlying disposition is not in
itself sufficient to automatically validate the penalty clause. For
instance, in Kern, the dispositions contained in the will were valid,
and yet the penalty clause was found to be invalid and
unenforceable. 133 There was nothing suspicious or questionable
about the dispositions contained in the will-it was the penalty
clause that created the problem.' 34 The penalty clause threatened to
punish all of the legatees under the will should the will be attacked
"in any way by any heir. 1 35 The contestant did not have to be a
legatee under the will. 136 The court refused to uphold the
overbroad provision because a third party could assert virtually
unlimited control over the legatees. 137 To illustrate how a valid
disposition may still contain an invalid penalty clause, imagine that
Bob left his entire estate to his three children to be divided equally
among them. There is nothing objectionable about this bequest, but
the will also contained a penalty clause threatening forfeiture by all
children should any one of them contest the will. The will specified
that in case of enforcement of the penalty clause, the whole estate
be burned to ashes so as to deprive everyone of its ownership. As
in Kern, the court would likely invalidate the penalty clause here as
well. First, it is overbroad in its effect: if Debbie, the oldest child,
challenges the will, the other two innocent descendants would
forfeit their share. Second, there is a strong public policy against
wasting property. Despite the annulment of the penalty clause, the
rest of the testament would remain valid and enforceable. In this
way, Kern and the hypothetical case illustrate that it is necessary to
separate the analysis of the underlying disposition from the inquiry
into the validity of the penalty clause. Indeed, the dispositions can
be valid, and yet the penalty clause may be invalid and
unenforceable.
Further, even if the will itself contains nothing reprehensible,
and the penalty clause is not contrary to the law or public order, in
133. Succession of Kern, 252 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), writ
refused, 254 So. 2d 462 (La. 1971); see discussion supra Part III.C.
134. Kern, 252 So. 2d at 510.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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some circumstances enforcing the penalty clause against the
contesting beneficiary may be unfair. That is to say, the validity of
both the underlying disposition and the penalty clause should not
automatically result in enforcement of the penalty. There may be
legitimate grounds for contest, such as "lack of testamentary
capacity, fraud, undue influence, improper execution, forgery, or
subsequent revocation by a later will," for which the contesting
beneficiary should not be punished by forfeiture.'38 In the example
in the introduction, Bob's daughter Debbie had every reason to
believe that Abby, the bookkeeper, exerted undue influence upon
Bob. Abby was not related to Bob, and she held a confidential
position as Bob's assistant. Only Abby and her relatives were
present during the amendment of Bob's will, and Bob's mind was
clouded before his death. As a result of the amendment, Abby
received twenty-five percent of the estate. Based on the evidence,
the court nonetheless could conclude that undue influence was not
present because Abby was a diligent assistant whom Bob wanted
to reward for all her hard work. The testament would then be found
valid by the court. Additionally, the standard format of the penalty
provision does not raise suspicion and is not overbroad, so it would
likely be found valid as well. Nevertheless, Debbie had no way of
knowing what the judge would conclude based on the evidence.
This situation illustrates that the validity of the disposition and of
the penalty clause contained therein should not always result in
forfeiture; in other words, validity does not equal enforceability.
Where the facts strongly indicate the potential of undue influence
(or fraud, forgery, etc.), the legatee has no way to predict the
court's final conclusion. 139 This example demonstrates the
inadequacy of the civil law's automatic enforceability approach.
F. The Confusion of Louisiana's Approach and the Need to Find a
Solution
The perplexed state of Louisiana's approach to penalty clauses
poses problems not only for legatees under a will, but also for
testators and practitioners advising those testators in regard to
estate planning. From the example in the introduction, Bob's
daughter Debbie is quite daring to bring suit for invalidation of her
138. Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Provision of Will or Trust
Instrument for Forfeiture or Reduction of Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 23
A.L.R. 4TH 369 (1983) [hereinafter Validity Annotation].
139. Brown, supra note 6, at 424 ("This appears to be a peculiarly strict and
uncomforting rule as far as the doubtful legatee or heir is concerned. He is as a
matter of fact debarred from the court unless he is ready to stake everything on
the outcome.").
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father's will. It may be somewhat comforting to Debbie that no
penalty clause has ever been enforced in Louisiana, but the lack of
an analytical framework in the law makes will contests a perilous
enterprise. The risk is great, as Debbie may forfeit her entire
bequest if the court decides to implement the penalty of forfeiture.
Thus, her options are (1) to give up twenty-five percent of what
she counted on as being hers just a few days before her father
passed away or (2) to risk the remaining seventy-five percent of
the estate that her father bequeathed her. Is a bird in the hand worth
two in the bush? It very well may be, considering the
jurisprudential confusion regarding penalty clauses. Testators like
Bob also are in a precarious position because, thus far, no
Louisiana court has enforced a penalty provision, thereby ignoring
the testator's desire to avoid the skirmish over his estate.
Moreover, in advising people of estate planning, Louisiana
practitioners may be reluctant to recommend using a penalty
provision and may avoid this "toothless" device, preferring instead
to resort to alternative measures.
In analyzing Debbie's claim, will the court follow the example
of Gardiner and dismiss the suit for failure to state a cause of
action without analyzing the validity of the will? Will the court
conclude that Debbie's suit is not a contest triggering the penalty
clause, as did Rosenthal? Or, perhaps, as in Wagner, will the court
ascertain that the disposition is a conditional donation, contingent
upon Debbie acquiescing in Bob's wish to bequeath to Abby? And,
ultimately, if the court concludes that the will and the penalty
clause are both valid, will the court punish Debbie by enforcing the
penalty clause? How much weight will the court afford Bob's
intent to punish the contestant?
IV. COMMON LAW APPROACH AND HISTORY
Neither the confused Louisiana jurisprudence nor the
traditional French approach provide an adequate resolution for the
courts' earnest quest to offer an equitable result for all parties. The
language barrier and general lack of access to foreign sources
make it difficult to seek guidance in today's civil law. r4° Perhaps
Louisiana could once again look to common law for an analytical
framework applicable to penalty clauses. In the past, Louisiana law
of successions and donations has borrowed liberally from common
140. See generally Roger Ward, The Death of the French Language in
Louisiana, in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 41 (Vernon
Palmer ed., 1999).
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law. 14 1 This is a welcome trend as it promotes uniformity and
facilitates interstate will probate. Moreover, the U.S. common law
boasts of abundant jurisprudence and doctrine tackling no-contest
provisions. In fact, common law has a long history of dealing with
penalty clauses and of managing to accomplish fair and equitable
resolution of the issue.
A. British Common Law: The Emergence of the Good Faith,
Probable Cause Exception
Throughout the years, common law has formulated not one but
many approaches to analyzing penalty clauses. 142 In Great Britain,
equity and chancery courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
testaments. 43 Historically, devises of real property were governed
by common law courts of chancery, and bequests of personal
property were subject to the civil law rules of ecclesiastical
courts. 44 In cases dealing with real estate, the English common
law viewed penalty clauses as valid and enforceable even if there
was no residual disposition, called a gift over. 145 Conversely,
ecclesiastical courts, with their civil law foundation, 146 regarded
penalty clauses enforceable only when a personal property devise
contained a gift over clause. 47 When personal property devises did
141. See, e.g., Laurie Dearman Clark, Louisiana's New Law on Capacity to
Make and Receive Donations: "Unduly Influenced" by the Common Law?, 67
TUL. L. REV. 183, 228 (1992) (stating that Louisiana law regarding mental
capacity, fraud, duress, and undue influence as grounds for nullity in donations are
based in common law); Cynthia Ann Samuel, The 1997 Successions and
Donations Revision-A Critique in Honor of A.N. Yiannopoulos, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1041, 1067 (1999) (noting that the Louisiana rule of anti-lapse is based on a
typical common law anti-lapse provision). Additionally, the concepts behind a few
Civil Code articles come from common law. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493
(2008) (forced heirship); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1478 (2008) (undue influence).
142. See generally Validity Annotation, supra note 138.
143. Begleiter, supra note 2, at 649. See generally EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 26 (4th ed.
2004) (discussing the British court system).
144. See Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled
Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 239 (1998)
(producing a thorough historical account with vivid and entertaining examples
of the earliest known penalty clauses); see also Moskowitz v. Federman, 51
N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943) (providing a brief historical account).
145. Beyer et al., supra note 144, at 239 (citing 5 WILLIAM J. BOWE &
DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.29, at 470 (1962)).
146. Id. at 239; cf Brown, supra note 6, at 425 ("[T]he only place from
which [the ecclesiastical courts' approach] could have possibly come in the
Roman law is from the abandoned doctrine of absolute invalidity once advanced
by the Proculians.").
147. Moskowitz, 51 N.E.2d at 54.
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not include a gift over provision, ecclesiastical courts considered
them unenforceable and viewed them as in terrorem, or mere
threats, 148 since the goal of such clauses was "to frighten the
legatee into compliance.'
' 49
One of the earliest known decisions was the High Court of
Chancery's analysis in Powell v. Morgan, where the testatrix
devised her land to an heir upon the condition that the heir refrain
from contesting her will. 150 Responding to the heir's challenge of
the will, the High Court of Chancery found that the challenge
occurred for probable cause and did not enforce the penalty. r 1
Without giving reasons for its conclusion, this seminal decision
"developed the first rudimentary good faith, probable cause
exception" to enforcing penalty clauses.
1 52
To understand the intricacy of the British common law
approach, recall Bob's will. The jurisdiction and the analysis
would depend on whether Bob's will was devising real or personal
property. If Bob owned and bequeathed only his jewelry, or
personal property, his will would be probated by a civil law
ecclesiastical court. The ecclesiastical court would review the
penalty clause to see whether it included a gift over, that is,
whether Bob named a residuary legatee in case of forfeiture by the
contestant-legatee. Because Bob's penalty clause did not contain
such a clause, the court would consider the penalty provision a
mere threat and would not give it any effect.' 51 On the other hand,
if Bob's estate included a parcel of land, or real property, the
chancery courts would have jurisdiction over Bob's will. In this
case, if Bob's daughter Debbie decided to contest the will, the
court would find the penalty provision enforceable unless Debbie's
suit could qualify for a Powell good faith, probable cause
exception.154 The court in Powell did not provide any insight into
the applicability of the exception, but the tradition of affording
148. Beyer et al., supra note 144, at 239.
149. Moskowitz, 51 N.E.2d at 54.
150. Beyer et al., supra note 144, at 236 (citing Powell v. Morgan, (1688) 23
Eng. Rep. 668 (Ch.); Browder, supra note 7, at 320 n. 1; Jack Leavitt, Scope and
Effectiveness of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testaments, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 45, 48 n.12 (1963)).
151. Id. (citing Powell, 23 Eng. Rep. at 668).
152. Id. (citing Dawn Koren, No-Contest Clauses: Settlement Offers from the
Grave, 12 PROB. L.J. 173, 176 (1995); Leavitt, supra note 150, at 59).
153. An example of a penalty clause that would be considered to contain a gift
over under British law is the testament in Kern, where, in case of forfeiture, the
estate was to pass to the Crippled Children's Hospital. Succession of Kern, 252
So. 2d 507, 510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), writ refused, 254 So. 2d 462 (La. 1971).
154. Powell, 23 Eng. Rep. 668.
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leeway to contestants suing in good faith and for probable cause
was carried on by the American common law.
155
B. The American Common Law History
Early on, American courts tended to pick and choose what they
wanted to follow from British law. The earliest known decision of
an American court on the issue of no-contest clauses is Bradford v.
Bradford. 156 The case upheld the in terrorem provision, noting that
reasonable penalty conditions are "in conformity with good policy
...to prevent litigation.' 157 Imposing the penalty of forfeiture
upon the contestant, the court rejected the traditional British
approach of distinguishing between real and personal property and
the requirement for a gift over provision. 158
Later, in the 1898 case of Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, the
United States Supreme Court expressed its view on a penalty
provision.159 The testator in that case left a legacy to some of his
family members, stating that "bequests are all made upon the
condition that the legatees acquiesce in this will. ' 160 In the event of
forfeiture due to an attack upon the will, the testator bequeathed
"the share or shares of any disputink this will to the residuary
legatee," the Smithsonian Institution. 1 The Court upheld the in
terrorem provision, employing some of the most frequently cited
language in support of penalty clauses.162 It concluded that penalty
clauses are "good law and good morals" as they prevent from
being "brought to-light matters of private life that ought never to
be made public, and in respect to which the voice of the testator
cannot be heard either in explanation or denial, and as a result the
manifest intention of the testator is thwarted."' 6 3 The legacies of
Bradford-which abolished the gift over requirement and
eliminated the distinctions between realty and personalty-and of
Meech-which underscored the positive aspects of penalty
155. Beyer et al., supra note 144, at 236.
156. 19 Ohio St. 546, 547 (Ohio 1869).
157. Id. at 548.
158. Id. at 547, 549. Some U.S. states still condition the validity of the penalty
clause upon the requirement of a gift over. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-68
(West 2003) ("A condition in terrorem shall be void unless there is a direction in
the will as to the disposition of the property if the condition in terrorem is violated,
in which event the direction in the will shall be carried out.").
159. 169 U.S. 398 (1898).
160. Id. at 402.
161. Id.
162. Beyer et al., supra note 144, at 240 n.95 (citing Browder, supra note 7,
at 332).
163. Smithsonian Inst., 169 U.S. at415.
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provisions-have survived throughout the years and persist in
American common law today.
C. The American Common Law Today
The modem common law approach varies from state to state.
164
States initially treat penalty clauses as either valid or invalid, but
most of the time they are willing to deviate from those
classifications for varying reasons. For example, two states,
Florida and Indiana, have statutes that hold penalty clauses
unenforceable regardless of the circumstances. 166 Georgia regards
penalty clauses as invalid unless there is a direction in the will as
to the disposition of the property if the penalty clause is violated.
167
New York, on the other hand, presumes a penalty clause is valid
unless the beneficiary contests for one of a number of statutorily
prescribed reasons. 16 The courts of some common law states will
164. Even within a particular state, the approach is not always uniform. See
Sharon J. Ormond, No Contest Clauses in California Wills and Trusts: How
Lucky Do You Feel Playing the Wheel of Fortune?, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 613,
657 (1997) (providing a detailed account of California's unstable approach to in
terrorem clauses and noting that "[t]he history of the California courts'
interpretation of no contest clauses has been long and somewhat
schizophrenic"). For a comprehensive fifty-state survey on the issue, see Beyer
et al., supra note 144; see also Validity Annotation, supra note 138.
165. One scholar has described the states' treatment of penalty clauses as
falling under one of four broad categories: "(1) void, (2) valid but usually
ineffective as overbroad, (3) generally valid, (4) valid unless the contestant
brought the will contest in good faith and with probable cause." Beyer et al.,
supra note 144, at 242.
166. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2005) ("A provision in a will
purporting to penalize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting
other proceedings relating to the estate is unenforceable."); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-
1-6-2 (West 1999) ("If, in any will admitted to probate in any of the courts of this
state, there is a provision or provisions providing that if any beneficiary thereunder
shall take any proceeding to contest such will or to prevent the admission thereof
to probate, or provisions to that effect, such beneficiary shall thereby forfeit any
benefit which said will made for said beneficiary, such provision or provisions
shall be void and of no force or effect.").
167. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-68 (West 2003) ("A condition in
terrorem shall be void unless there is a direction in the will as to the disposition
of the property if the condition in terrorem is violated, in which event the
direction in the will shall be carried out."); Linkous v. Nat'l Bank of Ga., 274
S.E.2d 469, 470 (Ga. 1981) (invalidating the in terrorem clause in the will in the
absence of a gift over and noting that no contest clauses are "not favored in the
law and, like all restrictions, must be strictly construed").
168. See, e.g., Anne Marie Guglielmo, In Terrorem Clauses: Do They Really
Work?, 26 WESTCHESTER B.J. 19 (1999). The author states that penalty
provisions are generally valid in New York and lists statutory exceptions, the
not enforce penalty provisions if the testator tries to assert too
much control over the legatees or if the clause is overbroad in any
other way. 169
The most prevalent approach is that endorsed by the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) and Restatement (Third) of Property.17 0 The
UPC views penalty clauses as valid unless the contest was brought
in good faith and for probable cause. 171 Depending on the
jurisdiction, the exception for good faith, probable cause contests
may be codified or based in common law.' "2 The states that codify
the good faith, probable cause exception generally follow the
relevant provision of the UPC-section 2-517-which mandates
that "[a] provision in a will purporting to penalize an interested
person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings
relating to the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for
instituting proceedings."' 173 The good faith, probable cause
exception effectively preserves the contesting beneficiary's share
even if the no-contest clause is valid. The chief reason for allowing
the good faith, probable cause exception is that "public policy
application of which precludes forfeiture by the contestant as a matter of law;
the contestant may:
(1) [B]ring a contest to establish that the will is a forgery or that it was
revoked by a subsequent will, provided that such a contest is based on
probable cause; (2) object to the jurisdiction of the probate court; (3)
disclose any information to any party or to the court related to any
document offered for probate; (4) refuse or fail to join in a petition for
probate and/or refuse to sign a "waiver and consent" to probate; (5) to
conduct preliminary examinations of the will's attesting witnesses,
draftsperson, nominated executors and proponents in a probate
proceeding; and (6) institute, join or acquiesce in a will construction
proceeding, without violating an in terrorem clause.
Id. at 20.
169. Beyer et al., supra note 144, at 244.
170. See generally Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., New Developments in United States
Succession Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 114 n.59 (2006) (providing a list of
states that have recently adopted the approach of the good faith, probable cause
exception).
171. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-517, 3-905 (amended 1997); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATiVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (2003).
172. Ronald Z. Domsky, In Terrorem Clauses: More Bark Than Bite?, 25
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 496-97 (1994).
173. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-517 (1997); see also id. § 3-905 (containing
the identical language as applied to Probate and Administration of Wills); cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 171, § 8.5 ("A provision in a
donative document purporting to rescind a donative transfer to, or a fiduciary
appointment of, any person who institutes a proceeding challenging the validity
of all or part of the donative document is enforceable unless probable cause
existed for instituting the proceeding.").
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demands that courts admit to probate only those wills where the
testator possessed testamentary capacity, that were executed in
accordance with the statutory formalities, and that were not the
product of undue influence." 4
The eligibility of a beneficiary for the good faith, probable
cause exception is a fact-specific inquiry. ' This case-by-case
approach achieves equitable results because the court reviews the
policy behind enforcing a particular penalty clause. Due to the
myriad of potential situations surrounding will contests, it is
difficult to develop a single definition of probable cause. A recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Arizona adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Property definition of the term: "the
existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of
evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed
and advised, to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that
the contest or attack will be successful."' 176 This "reasonable
person" inquiry reviews the objective reasons for will contests. 177
The Arizona decision also emphasized that good faith of the
contestant is essential because "subjective belief in the basis of the
challenge is Rart of the required belief in the substantial likelihood
of success." 8 Thus, the approach taken by the court reviews the
subjective and objective reasonableness of "the substantial
likelihood of success" at the time the action was brought. 179 The
174. Begleiter, supra note 2, at 641 (citing S. Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John,
101 A. 961, 963 (Conn. 1917); Porter v. Baynard, 28 So. 2d 890, 897 (Fla.
1946); In re Cocklin's Estate, 17 N.W.2d 129, 136 (Iowa 1945); In re Hartz's
Estate, 77 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1956); Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J.,
432 A.2d 890, 903 (N.J. 1981); In re Estate of Seymour, 600 P.2d 274, 278
(N.M. 1979); In re Kathan's Will, 141 N.Y.S. 705 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1913); Ryan v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 70 S.E.2d 853, 856 (N.C. 1952); In re Friend's
Estate, 58 A. 853 (Pa. 1904); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954), modified on other grounds, 277 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1955); First Methodist
Episcopal Church S. v. Anderson, 110 S.W.2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Calvery v. Calvery, 55 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932)).
175. 80 AM. JuR. 2D Wills § 1340 (2008).
176. In re Estate of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Ariz. 2000) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 cmt. j (1983))
(emphasis omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1066. Two of the testator's daughters contested a will that left
one-fourth to his bookkeeper. Id. at 1064. The trial judge enforced the penalty
provision against the daughters after concluding that the will was valid and that
there was no undue influence. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, relying on the
trial court's finding that there was no undue influence. Id. The supreme court
reversed, emphasizing the need to review whether the contestant could be
eligible for the good faith, probable cause exception at the time the proceedings
were instituted, not after the trial court finished its fact-finding. Id. at 1069. The
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"good faith" prong concentrates on the subjective state of mind of
the contestant, while the "probable cause" aspect dwells on the
objective circumstances surrounding the contest. In applying the
articulated standard to the provision in the will, courts have noted
that penalty clauses are not favored because of the resulting
forfeiture.' This warrants the liberal application of the good faith,
probable cause exception.
18 1
Thus, if Debbie filed suit to annul her father's will for reasons
of undue influence in one of the many common law states that
endorse the good faith, probable cause exception, the outcome of
the suit would depend on whether she could demonstrate that her
lawsuit was objectively and subjectively reasonable.' 82 Application
of the exception achieves an equitable result as it permits the court
to properly balance the countervailing policies: Bob's freedom to
dispose of his estate and Debbie's right to sue. Using this analysis,
American courts are able to reach equitable results, and Louisiana
should follow their example.
V. SOLUTION FOR LOUISIANA: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF
PENALTY CLAUSES
The ideal framework for Louisiana's analysis of penalty
clauses is an amalgam of Louisiana jurisprudence, the traditional
French approach, and the prevalent analysis of the American
court found that there was probable cause for a contest due to the circumstances
surrounding the drafting and execution of the will. Id. at 1068.
But see Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 633 S.E.2d 722 (S.C. 2006), for an
example of a case where the beneficiary did not have probable cause to contest
the will on the basis of undue influence. The testator's children alleged undue
influence. Id. at 724. The court concluded that "[fjamily discord and strife,
coupled with a less-than-favorable inheritance, do not constitute probable
cause." Id. at 727. The court found that the ninety-one-year-old testator was
"fully capable of executing testamentary documents. He maintained his
independence, was freely permitted to come and go from his home and office as
he desired, having opportunities to visit relatives, friends, and business
associates without supervision." Id. at 728. The court concluded that the testator
was in good physical and mental health up until his death. Id. at 727-28. Since
the beneficiaries could not show probable cause, the penalty clause was held
valid and enforceable. Id. at 728.
180. Id. at 1067 (citing Schaeffer v. Chapman, 861 P.2d 611, 614 (Ariz.
1993) (forfeiture clause in a contract)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.,
supra note 176, § 9.1 reporter's note 7; Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, What
Constitutes Contest or Attempt to Defeat Will Within Provision Thereof
Forfeiting Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 3 A.L.R. 5TH 590, 611 (1992).
181. Id.
182. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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common law. The first step in the analysis should be based on
Louisiana decisions that determine whether the judicial action
brought by the heir is a contest that triggers the penalty clause. The
second step should consist of three subparts, incorporating the
French approach of determining the validity of the underlying
disposition, the examination of the validity of the penalty clause,
and the common law determination of enforceability of the
penalty, allowing for a good faith, probable cause exception.
A. Step One: Determining Whether the Lawsuit Is a Contest
If a Louisiana court is faced with a penalty clause, the first step
should be to determine whether the lawsuit brought by the heir
amounts to a contest. In answering this question, it is necessary to
construe the language of the penalty clause to see whether the suit
triggers the application of the penalty. The interpretation of a
particular clause depends on "the nature and purpose of the
beneficiary's conduct and the attending circumstances, as well as
the language of the condition."1 3  184
This first step of the analysis is well-settled in Louisiana: it
was applied as early as 1918 in Succession of Rouse185 and as
183. See Browder, supra note 7, at 321.
184. This approach is also prevalent in the rest of the United States. See, e.g.,
David M. Swank, No-Contest Clauses: Issues for Drafting and Litigating, 29
CoLo. LAW. 57, 58 (2000) (noting that examples of a suit that may not trigger the
penalty clause are actions "to construe the document in question or... actions
challenging a fiduciary's administration of a trust or estate"). See generally
Browder, supra note 7, at 320-27 (providing a discussion of cases where a lawsuit
does not amount to a contest); Catalano, supra note 180 (producing a
comprehensive review of the relevant law in different jurisdictions).
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Alabama provides a prime
example of the construction of a no-contest clause to determine whether the
judicial action brought violated the clause and should result in forfeiture.
Harrison v. Morrow, 977 So. 2d 457 (Ala. 2007). Two beneficiaries under the
will at bar filed a suit, alleging that the signature of the testator was a forgery.
Id. at 458. The lower court disagreed with the allegation and admitted the will to
probate. Id A third beneficiary then brought the action for the enforcement of
the no-contest clause, demanding forfeiture of the original contestants' bequest.
Id. at 459. The supreme court noted that it was unnecessary to analyze the
validity of the in terrorem provision because the lawsuit alleging forgery did not
fall within the meaning of the penalty clause. Id. The court construed the
language of the penalty clause to proscribe "only challenges to procedures for
the distribution of specific bequests and percentages thereof," while the lawsuit
brought by the two beneficiaries only questioned the disposition of the estate. Id.
at 462. In its analysis, the court relied on the principle that "equity abhors
forfeiture" and emphasized the need to narrowly construe the no-contest clause.
Id. at 460 (citing Kershaw v. Kershaw, 848 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2002)).
185. 80 So. 229 (La. 1918).
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recently as 2006 in Succession of Scott. 186 In Rouse, the children of
the testator sued the succession and their step-mother for the
settlement of the community formerly existing between the
plaintiffs' father and mother.1 87 The defendant-widow reconvened,
seeking enforcement of the penalty clause in the will and alleging
that the plaintiffs' petition amounted to an attack upon the will,
which should result in forfeiture of their shares.1 88 Since the suit
was in essence a settlement of the decedent's community property
with his deceased ex-wife, the Louisiana Supreme Court dismissed
the step-mother's allegations, stating that "[t]his is not a suit to fix
the rights of his heirs in the succession of [the decedent], or to
contest the will of [the decedent) , and the provision in that will has
no application or effect here." 9 There was no need to further
discuss the penalty clause.
Similarly, in the case of Scott, the First Circuit Court of Appeal
interpreted a penalty clause that stated, "If any of the named
legatees should contest any provision in this will, then the naming
of that person in [the] will shall be struck and they shall not be
considered to be a legatee."'190 The daughter, an income beneficiary
of a trust created by the will, brought a petition for a declaratory
judgment, asking the court to confirm that the in terrorem
provision did not apply to her as she was not one of the "named
beneficiaries" under the will. 191 The court agreed with the
petitioner, noting the difference between the legal status of a trust
beneficiary and that of a legatee. 192 Thus, the court granted a
declaratory judgment in the daughter's favor, ruling that her future
lawsuit would not amount to a contest so as to result in
forfeiture.' 93
In these cases, the threshold determination that a judicial action
is not a contest eliminated the need to answer the difficult
questions regarding the validity and enforceability of the penalty
clause. 194 Conversely, presuming that every lawsuit is a contest
would trigger the unnecessary analysis of a penalty provision that
186. 950 So. 2d 846, 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006), writ denied, 948 So. 2d
176 (La. 2007).
187. Rouse, 80 So. 229.
188. Id. at 234.
189. Id.
190. Scott, 950 So. 2d at 847.
191. Id. at 848.
192. Id. at 849.
193. Id.
194. See also Succession of Rosenthal, 369 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979) (concluding that a suit for improper estate administration did not amount
to a contest).
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by its terms may not be applicable to the particular suit. Some
commentators are in favor of the latter approach-the broad
reading of the penalty clauses-because penalty clauses prevent
litigation over the testator's estate and increase the chance that the
testator's intent is upheld. 195 However, actions like the one brought
by the children for the settlement of the community in Rouse or the
suit filed by the heir in Rosenthal challenging the improper estate
administration are not lawsuits of the type testators try to forestall.
In fact, a suit meant to prevent the squandering of the estate by the
executrix would likely be welcomed by the testator. Such actions
facilitate the disposition of the estate according to the testator's
wishes. In addition, proponents of broad construction of penalty
clauses argue that narrow interpretation may create a flood of
vexatious and frivolous litigation. 196 This fear is unfounded
because the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure includes devices
that preclude worthless claims from being tried on the merits.
197
Most of such claims are disposed of through pre-trial exceptions or
motions. 198
Accordingly, when construing the language of the clause,
Louisiana courts have concentrated on the intent of the testator
while also keeping in mind the interests of the beneficiary, 199 and
they should continue to do so. If the court initially determines that
the judicial action brought is not a contest within the meaning of
the penalty clause, the court need not determine the validity and
enforceability of the clause, and the analysis ends there. If,
however, the lawsuit is the exact kind that the testator had in mind,
the court should proceed to ascertain the validity and enforceability
of the penalty clause.
195. See Begleiter, supra note 2, at 630 (arguing that "the courts should
abandon the strict construction of no contest clauses").
196. Id. at 634 n.38 (citing Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 504 (Ala. 1881);
In re Estate of Hite, 101 P. 443, 444 (Cal. 1909); Barry v. Am. Sec. & Trust Co.,
135 F.2d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1943)).
197. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 921 (2008) (defining exceptions as
"a means of defense, other than a denial or avoidance of the demand, used by
the defendant, whether in the principal or an incidental action, to retard, dismiss,
or defeat the demand brought against him"). See generally FRANK L. MARAIST
& HARRY T. LEMMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.4, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 145-50 (2d ed. 2008) (providing a comprehensive account of various
exceptions).
198. MARAIST & LEMMON, supra note 197, § 6.4 and cases cited therein. The
only case dealing with a penalty clause that was dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action is Gardiner, 366 So. 2d 1065, 1069 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), writ
denied, 369 So. 2d 154 (La. 1979); see discussion of Gardinersupra Part IlI.D.
199. Succession of Wagner, 431 So. 2d 10, 12 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983);
Gardiner, 366 So. 2d at 1069 (underscoring the need to ascertain the testator's
intent).
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To illustrate this step in the analysis, suppose that Bob's
daughter Debbie sues to annul the will, claiming that Abby unduly
influenced her father. After Abby files her reconventional demand
asking the court to enforce the penalty clause against Debbie, the
court should first look at the face of the clause to determine
whether Debbie's suit is within its scope. The clause in this case
forewarns that the beneficiary will forfeit her share if she in any
manner whatsoever contests or attacks the will. Debbie's suit seeks
to annul the will based on the circumstances surrounding its
amendment. Thus, her judicial action will be tantamount to a
contest or an attack on the will, as contemplated by the penalty
clause. Once the court finds that Debbie's suit is a contest under
the penalty clause, then the court will proceed to analyze the
validity and enforceability of the clause.
B. Second Step: Validity and Enforceability
After the court determines that the lawsuit is a contest, the
second step in the analysis should incorporate the traditional
civilian examination of the underlying disposition and the common
law inquiry of whether the contest was brought in good faith and
for probable cause. The second stage of the analysis should focus
on three subparts: (1) the validity of the underlying disposition, (2)
the validity of the penalty clause, and (3) the enforceability of the
penalty clause.2 °°
1. Validity of the Underlying Disposition
To determine the validity of the underlying disposition, the
court should use the traditional French determination of whether
the disposition itself violates the law or public order.20 1 The person
contesting the will has to establish the invalidity by a
preponderance of the evidence.20 2 If the contestant can show that
the underlying disposition is contrary to the law or public morals,
then the penalty provision becomes illicit or immoral and should
be deemed unwritten, as mandated by article 15 19.203
Hence, at this stage of the analysis, Debbie would attempt to
prove that her father's assistant, Abby, exerted undue influence
upon Bob and that consequently his will is invalid. If Debbie
succeeds, Louisiana courts should follow the example of their
200. See discussion supra Part III.E.
201. See discussion supra Part II.B.
202. See Swank, supra note 184, at 58.
203. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1519 (2008).
20101 COMMENT 1295
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
French counterparts and end the inquiry there. The penalty clause
will be considered unwritten, and Debbie will not be penalized by
forfeiture.
2. Validity of the Penalty Clause
Conversely, if Debbie fails to meet her burden of proof and the
court concludes that the underlying disposition contains nothing
contrary to the law or public order, the court should then examine
the effect of the penalty provision. Sweeping provisions are more
likely to be considered invalid as against public order. 204 For
instance, if the penalty clause threatens forfeiture by all heirs,
should any of them contest, the court should follow Kern to
205invalidate the overbroad penalty clause. Once again, under these
circumstances, the penalty clause will be deemed unwritten under
article 1519, and Debbie will not be penalized.2 °6
3. Enforceability of the Penalty Clause and the Good Faith,
Probable Cause Exception
The most difficult question arises if both the underlying
disposition and the penalty clause proper are valid.2 °7 Although it
is important to enforce the testator's intent, the contesting heir may
have had reason to believe, at the time of contest, that the will was
defective. Thus, even if the penalty clause and the underlying
disposition are found to be valid by the court, the penalty clause
should not always be enforceable. The common law good faith,
probable cause inquiry appears most suitable for Louisiana
analysis. Just as medieval England at some point combined
common law and civilian analyses of no-contest clauses, so can
contemporary Louisiana.
20 8
The judicial adoption of common law principles does not
violate the civilian mandate of legislative supremacy. The broad
terms of article 1519 do not provide specific guidance for the
courts' analysis of penalty clauses, thus leaving it to the discretion
204. See discussion of Succession of Kern supra Part III.C.
205. Succession of Kern, 252 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), writ
refused, 254 So. 2d 462 (La. 1971).
206. Another example of an invalid penalty clause would be a provision that
requires that the estate be destroyed. See discussion supra Part III.E.
207. See discussion supra Part III.E.
208. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 144 (1986) (discussing the
civil law origins of ecclesiastical courts and common law roots of courts of
chancery).
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of the judges.20 9 "When no rule for a particular situation can be
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed
according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice,
reason, and prevailing usages." In applying article 1519, the
courts have broad discretion substantively (in determining whether
a particular provision is against the law or public policy) and
procedurally (in establishing a consistent analytical framework).
The exception for good faith, probable cause contests adds
another angle to the analysis of penalty provisions, taking into
consideration the position of the beneficiary and eliminating the
severity of the French doctrine. This approach is consistent with
Louisiana's civilian heritage as it encompasses the principle of
good faith that is prevalent throughout the Civil Code.211 The best
approach is to analyze both the objective and subjective aspects of
the contest.2 12 Accordingly, once a court establishes that the
penalty clause is valid, the burden is on the claimant to show "the
existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of
evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed
and advised, to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that
209. LA. CIv. CODEart. 1519 (2008).
210. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2008). The broad language of the article could be
an example of delegation to the judge of legislative authority. See generally
James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1993) (noting that "use
of indeterminate words which demand appraisal of values, such as 'fault,' 'good
faith,' 'public order,' or 'public policy' calls for judicial "rulemaking").
211. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2008); LA. Civ. CODE art. 1759
(2008); LA. Cwv. CODE art. 1770 (2008); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1975 (2008); LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2008); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1996 (2008); LA. CIV. CODE art.
2021 (2008); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2035 (2008) (providing examples of good faith
in various parts of the Civil Code). See generally Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71
TUL. L. REv. 1645 (1997) (discussing the concept of good faith as it is used in
the Civil Code).
212. Another way to achieve an equitable outcome and yet avoid the
importation of the common law concept of "probable cause" into Louisiana
successions is to define "good faith" to contain both objective and subjective
elements, similar to Civil Code article 3480 dealing with good faith acquisitive
prescription. "For purposes of acquisitive prescription, a possessor is in good
faith when he reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations, that he is
owner of the thing he possesses." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3480 (2008).
Substantively, the result would be the same as when the common law
terminology is applied. However, the author believes that the adoption of the
common law good faith, probable cause analysis will foster uniformity with
other jurisdictions and permit Louisiana practitioners and judges to seek
guidance in the abundant case law of other states.
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the contest or attack will be successful. 2 13 In evaluating the
objective and subjective factors, the courts engage in "a balance
between allowing a testator to discourage pesky contestants and
providing an avenue for legitimate contests where fraud, undue
influence or forgery seem likely." 214 The courts should look at the
contest as a spectrum of potential scenarios: the more serious and
public-policy implicating the allegation, the less showing should
be required by the beneficiary.2 15
For example, if the factual scenario naturally gives rise to a
suspicion of undue influence, as in the case of Bob's will, the very
existence of the circumstances may suffice to shield the
beneficiary from forfeiture imposed by the penalty clause.216
However, if the interest alleged by the beneficiary is purely
pecuniary (i.e., a claim that the heir did not get as much as she felt
entitled to receive), the factual showing of objective and subjective
factors becomes necessary. For instance, assume that Abby, Bob's
assistant, does not exist, and there is no suspicion of undue
influence. If the only reason Debbie attacks her father's will is to
receive a bigger share, Debbie will have to prove that there was a
substantial likelihood that her claim was meritorious at the time
she brought it before the court. In the absence of allegations that
implicate public interest-such as fraud, forgery, or undue
influence-there is no societal policy to support Debbie in her
quest for more money than what her father bequeathed to her. In
showing the existence of a substantial likelihood of success,
Debbie will need to prove both the objective and subjective
elements. To demonstrate her subjective state of mind, Debbie
could offer her testimony and other circumstantial evidence of the
existence of good faith on her part. Nevertheless, it is hard to
imagine that she could show the existence of objective probable
cause. She would need to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a reasonable person would believe in the success of
the action. Because this is a very stringent standard, Debbie is
unlikely to be eligible for the exception and will almost certainly
forfeit her bequest.
213. In re Estate of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Ariz. 2000) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP., supra note 176, § 9.1 cmt. j) (emphasis
omitted); see also Swank, supra note 184, at 58.
214. Guglielmo, supra note 168, at 21 (citations omitted).
215. Shumway, 9 P.3d at 1066 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.,
supra note 176, § 9.1 cmt. j) ("The evidence needed ... should be less where
there is strong public policy supporting the legal ground of the contest or
attack") (emphasis omitted).
216. See supra Introduction.
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Some courts and commentators have suggested that good faith,
probable cause exceptions should not be allowed and that penalty
clauses should be considered "valid and enforceable without
qualification." 217 One reason offered is that 2ood faith and
probable cause are inherently difficult to define.2  Although this
may be true, the exception provides a flexible solution for the
difficult task of balancing policy considerations. What is fair in
one case may not be fair as applied to the next scenario. The good
faith, probable cause exception affords the courts the necessary
discretion for handling a wide variety of wills and their contests.
Another argument against allowing leeway for good faith,
probable cause contests is that penalty clauses are "good law and
good morals," as noted by the United States Supreme Court.1 9
Penalty clauses may "discourage vexatious or unfounded litigation,
the family quarrels frequently attending proceedings of this type,
and the wasting of the testator's estate, or the defaming of his
reputation in protracted litigation over his will .. ,,220 However,
there is no basis to conclusively state that penalty clauses prevent
litigation. In fact, the insertion of a penalty clause at times may
result in doubling the litigation. For example, the Scott case was
based on the petition by the testator's daughter for a declaratory
judgment "seeking a declaration that she was not subject to the in
terrorem clause in her father's will because she was not one of the
'named legatees.', 2 2' The court granted the judgment in favor of
the daughter, which allowed her to bring the second action
regarding the will.22
2
217. See Browder, supra note 7, at 328 (discussing decisions that take this
approach).
218. Brown, supra note 6, at 427 ("The difficulty of determining exactly
what is probable cause for litigation will render it possibly ineffective, and
certainly unsatisfactory, since it tends away from a fixed standard and renders
the law uncertain."). For an argument that the good faith, probable cause
exception is inadequate in the context of penalty clauses, see Begleiter, supra
note 2, at 648 (pointing out the difficulty in defining "good faith" and "probable
cause" and noting that "[w]hen the testator makes his intent clear .. .the
testator's intent should be effectuated").
219. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898) (noting that will
contests can bring "to light matters of private life that ought never to be made
public, and in respect to which the voice of the testator cannot be heard either in
explanation or denial; and, as a result, the manifest intention of the testator is
thwarted"); see also Domsky, supra note 172, at 495 (discussing arguments in
favor of penalty clauses).
220. Browder, supra note 7, at 328.
221. In re Succession of Scott, 950 So. 2d 846, 848 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006),
writ denied, 948 So. 2d 176 (La. 2007); see discussion supra Part V.A.
222. Scott, 950 So. 2d at 849.
2010] COMMENT 1299
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Furthermore, not allowing an exception for good faith,
probable cause contests discourages heirs from bringing
meritorious actions. A penalty clause may serve as a shield "in the
hands of a wrongdoer who is named a beneficiary in a will through
fraud or undue influence., 223 The diligent heir-like Debbie-who
has a legitimate claim may be deprived of her day in court.2
24
Although there are strong policy reasons for upholding the wishes
of the testator and preventing unnecessary litigation, equally
persuasive policy dictates that wills established through forgery,
fraud, or undue influence should not be enforced. As noted by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina:
If a devisee should accept the fruits of the crime of forgery,
under the belief, and upon probable cause, that it was
forgery he would thereby become morally a particeps
criminis; and yet if he is unwilling to commit this moral
crime, he is confronted with the alternative of doing so, or
of taking the risk of losing all, under the will, in case it
should be found not to be a forgery.
225
Because penalty clauses implicate countervailing policy
considerations, it should be up to the courts to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to enforce the penalty clause.
Consequently, the good faith, probable cause exception
provides a practical solution to the current gap in Louisiana law
regarding the analysis of enforceability of penalty clauses as
applied to heirs attacking the will for reasons of public order. In
the absence of public policy considerations, the exception imposes
a stringent burden of proof on the contestant. Because the analysis
is flexible, it leaves much leeway for the courts to balance the
policy considerations on both sides-the testator's intent versus the
rights of the heir-so as to achieve a fair result.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to glean general principles from
Louisiana jurisprudence and offer an equitable solution that will
223. Domsky, supra note 172, at 495.
224. See generally Begleiter, supra note 2, passim (providing a detailed
discussion of policy considerations involved in the analysis of in terrorem
provisions). An essential part of the American legal system is the freedom of
access to courts. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("All courts shall be open, and
every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice,
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him
in his person, property, reputation, or other rights.").
225. Rouse v. Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 135 (S.C. 1912).
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fill the gaps in Louisiana courts' analysis of penalty clauses. In
scrutinizing penalty clauses, Louisiana courts should follow a two-
step approach: (1) construe the penalty clause to determine
whether the judicial action brought is a contest within the meaning
of the clause; and (2) establish the validity and enforceability of
the disposition and the penalty provision. Incorporation of the
common law good faith, probable cause exception into the second
part of this analysis alleviates the fear of forfeiture for the earnest
beneficiary who has well-founded concerns about the validity of
the will. Adherence to the proposed two-step approach not only
resolves the substantive question of the validity and enforceability
of no-contest clauses, but also formalizes the courts' analysis, thus
providing more predictability for the testator and the estate
planner.
Knowing how courts interpret in terrorem provisions will
influence the practitioners' advice to their clients in choosing the
right estate-planning strategy. It is a natural desire of all testators
that their will is enforced according to their intentions. Thus, "[i]n
an increasingly litigious environment, many estate planning clients
are seeking ways to prevent their estate plan from being challenged
or contested. ' ' 2 6 Due to the current uncertain status of in terrorem
provisions in Louisiana, practitioners should advise their clients of
other methods of ensuring that their estates will be distributed
according to their wishes. The following tactics may reduce the
risk of litigation: advising heirs of inheritance plans, using
revocable and irrevocable trusts instead of wills, using mediation
or arbitration clauses, or using other conditional donations.
227
However, if the testator is adamant about inserting an in terrorem
provision in the will, during its drafting practitioners should bear in
mind the potential interpretation of the penalty clause. Because
courts tend to construe penalty 2 provisions strictly, practitioners
must be precise in their drafting. For example, the penalty clause
should specifically list what actions by the heir are to be
considered a contest of the will.229 The clause should also clarify
when forfeiture is to take effect: upon the filing of the suit or after
226. Swank, supra note 184, at 57.
227. Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation Through
Disclosure, in Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 9 CARDOzo J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 237, 248-65 (2008).
228. Swank, supra note 184, at 59. But see Begleiter, supra note 2, at 675
(arguing that the clauses should be drafted as broadly as possible so that there is
less likelihood the court will forego applying the clause by concluding that the
action brought is not a contest).
229. Begleiter, supra note 2, at 675; see also Domsky, supra note 172, at
504.
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proceedings begin. 230 Additionally, if potential heirs do not receive
any legacy under the will, their motivation to contest increases
because they have nothing to lose.23 ' To reduce the probability of a
contest by a particular individual, the testator should include a
small bequest for the individual and insert a penalty clause, hoping
that the beneficiary will have an incentive not to contest the will.
231
To increase the chance of the enforcement of the penalty clause,
the testator should specify that in case of forfeiture the bequest
should go to some charitable organization or another party who
would then have an interest in bringing the action for the
enforcement.
233
Until Louisiana courts adopt the framework suggested herein,
heirs like Debbie who seek to contest a will with a penalty clause
have no guarantees. In the meantime, Debbie will be forced to
decide whether contesting the testament over twenty-five percent
of her father's estate is worth the risk of forfeiting the seventy-five
percent that she received. Debbie can merely hope that the court
will creatively forgo the penalty. Without the suggested
framework, uncertainty reigns for testators like Bob who, based on
the inconsistent analysis of penalty clauses thus far, execute
testamentary provisions not knowing whether their last wishes will
be honored. The proposed framework would solve both problems
by providing the courts with a standard that leaves room for an
equitable, case-by-case resolution.
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230. Domsky, supra note 172, at 504-05.
231. Swank, supra note 184, at 59. Also, if the potential contestant would
inherit by intestacy, the testator should consider bequeathing him slightly more
than his intestate share.
232. Id.
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